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The distinction between specific concrete rules and general abstract 
principles has engaged legal theorists for decades.
1
 This rules–principles 
distinction has also become increasingly important in corporate and secu-
rities law, as well as financial market regulation. One prominent example 
is the contrast between U.S. rules-based accounting—which attempts to 
specify in detail what parties should disclose—and European principles-
based accounting—which sets forth only general notions of disclosure.
2
 
This Article adds two important variables to the rules–principles 
debate: timing and source. Although these two variables are relevant to 
legal theory generally, the specific goal here is not to address and engage 
the rules versus principles literature directly. Rather, the goal here is to 
ask whether the debate about financial market regulation might benefit 
from a more transparent analysis of temporal and legal source variables. 
That is, the when and where of the application of both rules and princi-
ples. 
From capital requirements, to investment restrictions, to disclosure 
rules, much modern financial market regulation is focused on ex ante 
regulation.
3
 This focus on ex ante regulation is especially true outside the 
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United States and England, particularly in Asia, where regulators rely 
less on the private attorney general role of the plaintiffs’ bar.
4
 In contrast, 
decades ago, regulators throughout the world, but particularly in the 
United States, took more of an ex post approach. These regulators em-
phasized adjudication or regulatory assessment after-the-fact based on 
general principles rather than specific rules.
5
 This Article seeks to pro-
vide a framework for understanding and assessing the shift from ex ante 
to ex post and from principles to rules. 
In theory, rules or principles can be either specified in advance or 
applied after-the-fact, and can be applied both by private or public 
means. For example, either a regulator or private party might favor prin-
ciples that are established early and then adjudicated later. Alternatively, 
a regulator or private party might favor principles that are established 
later, only after a dispute occurs. Likewise, a regulatory approach might 
specify rules in advance of a transaction, or it might do so later on in the 
event of a dispute. In a dispute involving either principles or rules, the ex 
post adjudicator might be private or public: either an arbitrator or a 
judge. 
The complexity of modern markets has led to the proliferation of ex 
ante rules, which purport to provide greater certainty to regulators and 
market participants.
6
 In some cases, that certainty is important and wel-
come. In other cases, it has deleterious consequences. The proliferation 
of rules raises numerous policy questions, including whether financial 
markets would be better served by greater regulatory uncertainty. Market 
participants, then, would be less able to calculate the expected benefits 
and costs of complying with regulation based on anticipated probabilities 
and magnitudes. 
                                                        
 4. See Douglas Arner, Professor, Univ. of Hong Kong Dep’t of Law, Remarks at the Fifth 
Annual Berle Symposium, The Purpose and Nature of Financial Regulation (May 13, 2013) (tran-
script available at Seattle University School of Law Library). Of course, the public civil enforcement 
role is arguably more significant and influential outside the United States, particularly in Australia. 
 5. See Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting, 
(Roosevelt Inst. White Paper, Mar. 2010), available at http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/sites/ 
all/files/Off-Balance%20Sheet%20Transactions.pdf; http://www.rooseveltinstitute.org/policy-and-id 
eas/ideas-database/bring-transparency-balance-sheet-accounting. 
 6. In many prominent cases, this certainty is illusory. As of September 3, 2013, 280 of the 
rulemaking deadlines under the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010 had passed, yet there were final rules in place for only 108 (39%) of those items. See Dodd–
Frank Progress Report, DAVIS POLK (Sept. 3, 2013), http://www.davispolk.com/Dodd-Frank-
Rulemaking-Progress-Report/; see also Implementing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consum-
er Protection Act—Pending Action, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,  http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/dod 
d-frank/dfactivity-upcoming.shtml (last visited Sept. 3, 2013). 
2014] The Timing and Source of Regulation 425 
This Article does not seek to comprehensively answer the central 
questions about the optimal regulatory approach in financial markets, but 
instead, it poses a new way to ask those questions. For example, might ex 
ante principles act as an information-forcing mechanism and create in-
centives for private actors to internalize the costs of their behavior? 
Might the twin pillars of securities law—disclosure and enforcement—be 
better supported by a less certain regulatory approach that specifies broad 
principles ex ante, and then provides for adjudication of compliance ex 
post? Might there be advantages to simply banning “proprietary trading” 
as a general principle and then leaving the specific definitional challeng-
es and issues for adjudicators to resolve and formulate in future disputes, 
instead of attempting to specify the categories of permitted activity ex 
ante in a rules-based approach such as the Volcker Rule?
7
 Should parties 
be permitted to avoid fraud-related claims by including broad non-
reliance provisions in contracts? Should judges scrutinize disclaimers 
based on the actions of a party with superior information or sophistica-
tion? 
These are difficult questions, but they can be made more tractable 
by framing them in terms of the timing and the source of the relevant 
legal rules and principles. The goal here is to provide an analytic model 
to assess crucial aspects of these questions by focusing on the different 
types of ex ante and ex post regulatory approaches, and the relative ad-
vantages and disadvantages of each in modern, complex financial mar-
kets. The normative conclusions of this Article will necessarily be tenta-
tive, but my suggestion is that in many cases, there is wisdom in the his-
torical approach based on after-the-fact assessment. Thus, regulators and 
policy makers might benefit from considering the advantages of moving 
away from ex ante regulation in the direction of ex post adjudication. 
II. THE TIMING AND SOURCE OF LEGAL RULES AND PRINCIPLES 
The 2x2 diagram below illustrates the analytic structure offered 
here and the four polar approaches to regulation. Essentially, the four 
divisions are based on answers to two questions. First, how much regula-
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transaction, as opposed to in the future? Second, who should do the spec-
ifying? In other words, what is the timing and source of regulation? 
 
The Article’s positive claim is that regulation can be situated in, 
evolved along, or moved toward four different paths, depending on the 
timing and source of applicable legal rules. The applicable legal rules can 
be generated either ex ante or ex post, from entities that are either public 
or private. 
A. Contract 
The upper left quadrant—“Contract”—houses regulation that is 
specified in advance by private actors. This form of private “regulation” 
is increasingly prevalent. For example, one notable use of such private 
ordering in the financial markets is in over-the-counter derivatives, 
where hundreds of trillions of dollars of notional value of transactions 
are governed by documents created by the International Swaps and De-
rivatives Association, a trade group known as “ISDA.” U.S. corporate 
law also generally allows for extensive private ordering through ex ante 
specification of default rules. 
Private ordering through contract has obvious benefits, particularly 
when market participants are engaged in repeat play and there are reputa-
tional consequences to breaches. Ex ante contract rules are most likely to 
be optimal when transaction and agency costs are low, when there is par-
ity of information and sophistication between counterparties, and when 
the expected costs of market failures (particularly externalities and moral 
hazard) are minimal. Private ordering is less likely to be optimal when 
these conditions do not exist. 
Private actors can gather the capacity to specify ex ante rules 
through lobbying and influencing regulators and legislators. Thus, pri-
vate contract does not necessarily become a libertarian regime. Parties 
specifying legal rules can enjoy oligopolistic advantages due to being a 
first mover, such as barriers to entry or explicit exercise of market power. 
Both ex ante rules and principles are potentially subject to such influ-
ence. Private parties often have an information or sophistication ad-
vantage over public entities and are potentially more nimble and flexible. 
As a result, private ordering can better reflect private preferences, espe-
cially when large institutions are contracting with each other and there is 
repeat play. 
 Ex Ante Ex Post 
Private Contract Arbitration 
Public Regulation Adjudication 
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B. Arbitration 
The upper right quadrant—“Arbitration”—involves the assessment 
of parties’ conduct after the fact, typically based on generalized princi-
ples. For example, broker–client disputes are perhaps the most prominent 
example of this form of regulation. Perhaps U.S. corporate law might 
ultimately permit corporations to opt for arbitration in their bylaws, char-
ters, or both. Interestingly, ISDA documentation typically specifies that 
disputes involving over-the-counter derivatives will be resolved in feder-
al court in New York or under British law in London, but not through 
arbitration. 
Private arbitration can provide for helpful assessment of parties’ 
conduct after-the-fact, typically based on generalized principles. Arbitra-
tion is especially useful when parties have not specified contingencies ex 
ante or when they have done so but in an ambiguous manner. As with 
contract, arbitration can be subject to various forms of influence and 
market failure, including asymmetries in sophistication and information. 
Moreover, arbitration typically does not generate the benefits of 
precedent more generally associated with common law. Instead, disputes 
and results typically remain private and are therefore less useful to par-
ties anticipating or engaged in future disputes. The result can be incon-
sistent application of ex ante principles and disparate results. Of course, 
the same problems can be true of public adjudication by judges, but at 
least there is a public record of judicial decision making. 
C. Regulation 
The lower left quadrant, labeled “Regulation,” includes most mod-
ern financial and securities regulation. This body of legal rules has grown 
in recent years, as Congress and federal regulators have specified numer-
ous detailed rules for disclosure, conduct, capital requirements, and other 
substantive decisions and actions. The increasing specification of legal 
rules ex ante has created opportunities and incentives for regulatory arbi-
trage,
8
 particularly in areas related to tax, accounting, and credit ratings. 
It has also created “regulatory licenses,” entitlements that enable oli-
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Public regulation has potential benefits that are not generated by 
private contract. In theory, regulation can address market failures that 
private ordering cannot. However, regulators are subject to capture, and 
the public choice literature has demonstrated how regulation can favor 
particular groups instead of benefiting society overall. To some extent 
regulatory arbitrage is helpful in identifying rules that might be too cost-
ly to justify their benefits. Yet regulatory arbitrage also can generate in-
efficiencies, reduce transparency, and help private actors, whose public 
benefits exceed its private costs, avoid regulation. Regulatory licenses 
have the potential to assist regulators who are unable to police or under-
stand financial markets on their own, but they introduce distortions and 
over reliance, both of which can lead to serious problems (and were ar-
guably at the center of the recent financial crisis). Much modern financial 
regulation incentivizes regulatory arbitrage and creates regulatory licens-
es. 
D. Adjudication 
Meanwhile, the lower right quadrant, labeled “Adjudication,” has 
grown smaller, particularly in the most complex parts of the financial 
markets. This decrease in adjudication exists even while it remains prom-
inent in other areas of corporate and securities regulation where, perhaps 
not coincidentally, the legal principles and rules are less certain. These 
areas include insider trading, deal litigation, “plain vanilla” securities 
class actions, and, periodically, scandal-related litigation (e.g., options 
backdating and subprime-related fraud).
10
 
Adjudication can fill gaps left by contract and regulation. In addi-
tion, adjudication can potentially fill the gaps in a more complete and 
public manner than arbitration can. Through adjudication, courts can ad-
dress financial scandals and disputes in public ways that can both deter 
future abuse and create a framework for a new generation of private or-
dering. Likewise, adjudication allows courts to scrutinize prosecutions 
and settlements, thereby influencing not only private conduct but also 
regulator and prosecutor behavior.
11
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Nonetheless, the use of adjudication has declined because it is ex-
pensive and courts face scarce resources. Moreover, existing adjudication 
has become less useful because the body of cases addressing particular 
issues is so narrowly targeted and specialized that on-point precedents 
relevant to complex financial transactions can be unavailable. To some 
extent, uncertainty can be addressed by more sophisticated judicial rea-
soning. However, it is difficult to draw connections between disparate 
areas of finance, even for the most financially sophisticated judges.
12
 
Overall, the above 2x2 diagram can be used to consider different 
types of financial regulation and, more generally, to assess the source 
and timing of legal rules and principles. However, most regulation is not 
isolated within one of the four quadrants. Instead, it is a blend of one or 
more aspects of ex ante/ex post timing and public/private sourcing. For 
example, securities exchange-based regulation is primarily in the lower 
left quadrant, but elements of some rules—such as the independence re-
quirements of directors—are necessarily assessed ex post. Conversely, 
although broker-dealer regulation is primarily in the upper right quad-
rant, some basic requirements are specified in advance. Nonetheless, alt-
hough the lines are blurred, the polar modes of regulation are useful for 
analytic purposes. 
One question raised by the shift in some areas of financial regula-
tion from ex post to ex ante specification and from public to private is 
determining the optimal degree of regulation certainty. Some private ac-
tors—particularly large financial institutions—benefit from certainty and 
seek the detailed specification in ex ante rules through lobbying. Con-
versely, other market participants—such as less sophisticated investors—
benefit from uncertainty and prefer vague notions of fiduciary duty or 
fraud that can be enforced ex post. 
The classic elements of securities laws already have a degree of un-
certainty built into them through the ex post enforcement of broad, open-
ended principles such as the general prohibition of fraud. Disclosure re-
quirements and materiality are examples, as is securities fraud, where 
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uncertainty is common.
13
 The question is whether the costs of uncertainty 
are outweighed by the benefits of deterrence. Specifically, are market 
participants reasonably well situated to understand what “core conduct” 
will be prohibited ex post and therefore avoid straying too close ex ante? 
The answer depends on assumptions about the social value of deterred 
transactions. For example, one might accept the deterrence of transac-
tions that fall into the gray areas of insider trading, but not the deterrence 
of structure finance activities that fall into the gray areas of suitability. 
The effects of uncertainty vary in the context of complex modern finan-
cial practice. The next Part considers the application of the timing versus 
source rubric in the context of financial innovation. 
III. APPLICATION TO FINANCIAL INNOVATION 
To illustrate the application of this analytical model to particular ar-
eas of regulation, this Part briefly considers the regulation of selling 
complex financial products, including derivatives. Financial intermediar-
ies divide such transactions into two categories: counterparty transactions 
and client transactions.
14
 Counterparty transactions include over-the-
counter derivatives transactions and other privately negotiated transac-
tions. Banks generally refer to a wide range of such transactions as 
“market-making,” varying from traditional market-making activities, 
such as stock trading, to newer activities, such as credit default swaps 
and collateralized debt obligations.
15
 
Over time, the rights and obligations of parties to such transactions 
have moved from ex post public adjudication based on principles to ex 
ante specification of rules by private organizations.
16
 Financial institu-
tions, particularly banks and investment banks, negotiated and lobbied 
for this shift away from ex post facto adjudication; likewise, in recent 
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years, financial institutions also have explicitly lobbied against and re-
jected both private adjudication and public ex ante rulemaking.
17
 
Today, the over-the-counter derivatives markets—the largest mar-
kets in the world, financial or otherwise—are dominated by private legal 
rules, typically specified in one or more standard form documents. In this 
context, the most common source of private ex ante rules are the deriva-
tives documents provided by the ISDA. The primary membership of 
ISDA is composed of the major derivatives dealers, whose officers dom-
inate the officer and director positions within the ISDA.
18
 Derivatives 
“end-users” are not permitted to vote or to serve as officers or directors. 
Historically, ISDA has been an effective advocate for its dealer client 
base and has been less sensitive to end-users.
19
 
The core document used by most derivatives market participants to 
document and govern their transactions is the ISDA Master Agreement 
(ISDA Master). The ISDA Master contains a brief description of the 
most basic boilerplate terms governing the relationship between two de-
rivatives counterparties; it is rarely subject to extensive negotiation. In 
addition to the ISDA Master, the counterparties also typically enter into 
an ISDA Schedule Agreement (ISDA Schedule), which specifies more 
detail about their particular relationship. The ISDA Master and ISDA 
Schedule are roughly comparable to a corporation’s articles and bylaws, 
respectively. Then, for individual transactions, the parties typically sign a 
Confirmation, a third document that specifies the terms of a particular 
derivative transaction. In the corporate context, a Confirmation is rough-
ly analogous to a contract or the minutes from a board meeting approving 
a contract. 
Interestingly, ISDA documents typically do not provide for arbitra-
tion. In fact, the standard 1992 ISDA Master form does not contain an 
arbitration clause. Instead, section 11(b) of the agreement provides that 
each party submits irrevocably to the jurisdiction of the appropriate 
courts (English courts or federal courts in the Southern District of New 
York). 
One reason ISDA agreements do not provide for arbitration is be-
cause suitability, or “know your customer,” requirements apply in arbi-
tration. Although ISDA documents include non-reliance disclaimers that 
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purport to preclude application of suitability rules in arbitration, deriva-
tives market participants might nevertheless prefer court to arbitration if 
they perceive that judges (who are bound by the securities laws and rules 
of contract) are more likely to enforce those disclaimers than arbitrators 
(who are bound by Financial Industry Regulatory Authority rules).
20
 An 
interesting question is to what extent the counterparty versus client dis-
tinction should matter in adjudicating suitability. Specifically, should an 
ex ante agreed-upon classification by the parties affect whether the arbi-
tration or adjudication quadrant is the appropriate form of regulation? 
Like many financial contracts, ISDA documentation includes nu-
merous private legal rules, such as the various representations and war-
ranties of parties and the mechanisms for calculating payments owed 
following credit events or default. Private parties can use the privatiza-
tion of legal rules strategically based on information or sophistication 
asymmetry, or potentially in ways that generate externalities. They can 
lobby for rules that benefit ISDA members but disadvantage other pri-
vate parties. For example, ISDA has successfully lobbied for legislation 
and regulatory opinions in numerous nations confirming the enforceabil-
ity of certain provisions. These nations have given a range of assurances 
that they will enforce ISDA documents and language, including favora-
ble protection for over-the-counter derivatives in bankruptcy, such as 
enforceable netting and settlement outside the reach of the automatic 
stay. 
This favorable bankruptcy treatment of swaps is controversial, rais-
ing many questions.
21
 How should regulators address pressure between 
ex ante private specification and ex post public adjudication? For exam-
ple, what kinds of duties do counterparties to sophisticated financial con-
tracts owe to each other? How should judges interpret a clause specifying 
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that there are no such duties or that they are minimal? Obviously, judges 
will show deference to the parties’ specifications in private agreements, 
but should that deference be absolute? 
At some point, a judge might find that a duty arises based on evi-
dence of a substantial information or sophistication gap between the par-
ties, especially if such a gap generated a degree of trust in the relation-
ship. Likewise, an adjudicator might find that at some point a contract is 
so one-sided that it takes on adhesion-like qualities, particularly if it is a 
standard form contract not subject to negotiation. 
For many transactions, the existing contract language might provide 
a basis for an adjudicator to find that the more sophisticated party has 
undertaken duties to the less sophisticated party. Even one-sided agree-
ments include basic trust-related representations, and both parties pre-
sumably assumed that such representations are enforceable. More gener-
ally, parties expect that a duty of good faith and fair dealing will govern 
their activities. 
With respect to suitability, the key issue is the relative bargaining 
power of the parties—not the absolute sophistication level of the less 
sophisticated party. Relative bargaining power matters to the question of 
whether a standard-form contract term is actually an agreed-to part of a 
particular contract. If a term is not agreed upon, judicial creation of pro-
tective default rules can contribute to market efficiency. Absent these 
rules, parties with substantial information or sophistication disadvantages 
will exit, just as many end-users did from certain segments of the deriva-
tives markets in the mid-1990s. Interestingly, when end-users began re-
covering substantial settlements related to those 1990s transactions, those 
settlements created de facto default rules, or at least “default principles,” 
which encouraged end-users to reenter the markets. A similar result 
might follow from recent post-financial crisis settlements against banks. 
However, those disputes are ongoing, and it remains unclear whether 
they will be sufficiently broad to lead investors back into complex trans-
actions based on subprime mortgages. 
One explanation for ISDA’s dominance is that ISDA is simply 
more efficient than other rule providers and that the economies of 
providing standard-form contracts naturally will lead to a single provider. 
However, although standard-form derivatives documentation can be cost 
reducing, there are some reasons to believe that ISDA’s virtual monopo-
ly on the creation of legal rules might itself be problematic. For instance, 
ISDA’s first-mover advantage has created a substantial barrier to entry 
for any competing provider. In addition, ISDA dealer members exercise 
market power in creating legal rules. This market power is another ex-
ample of a market failure that might lead regulators to be skeptical of ex 
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ante rules-based contractual approaches and to implement an ex post 
principles-based adjudication instead. 
In general, privately sourced regulation is double-edged. On one 
hand, it is likely to be more informed than it might otherwise be. On the 
other hand, privately sourced regulation is likely to be less equitable and 
balanced, and to favor derivatives dealers over end-users. Parties to fi-
nancial contracts frequently value certainty and accordingly try to speci-
fy as many contingencies as possible in advance. Bond contracts, venture 
capital term sheets, and merger agreements are examples of specifying 
contingencies. The ex ante specifications in such contracts often evolve 
into standard-form documents, in which many terms generally become 
standard and are not negotiated. Even the corporation, in the view of 
some scholars, has been primarily a private “nexus of contracts” among 
various participants, including shareholders and stakeholders (though 
much of corporate law involves the assessment of ambiguities and gaps 
in the ex ante specifications). In sum, issues of timing and source of legal 
rules are raised in numerous business contexts. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This Article has set forth an analytic model for assessing the timing 
and source of regulation. It is meant to be a simple, straightforward 
“idea” article, not to resolve the questions about the relative advantages 
of each regulatory quadrant. 
The central idea of the model is that one can distinguish regulatory 
regimes by asking two questions: First, what is the timing of the specifi-
cation of the rules or principles at issue? Are they specified ex ante or ex 
post? Second, what is the source of the rules or principles? Are they pub-
lic or private? The answers to these questions suggest four categories of 
regulatory regime: contract, arbitration, regulation, and adjudication. The 
model does not dictate which regime might be optimal in a particular 
setting; however, it can be used to distinguish among regimes and to 
trace how regimes might change over time. 
As regulatory challenges spread throughout the world, including to 
Asia, this timing-source model might be useful to policy makers and 
market participants trying to assess optimal regulation. There are ad-
vantages and disadvantages to each quadrant, and the normative conse-
quences of a shift from ex post adjudication to ex ante contractual private 
ordering remain unclear. Nevertheless, the argument here is that under-
standing such a shift is preferable to simply ignoring it. 
 
